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This Article provides a perspective not normally available to U.S. legal scholars in the area
of comparative law – it is a firsthand account of criminal procedure reform in the Republic of
Indonesia. Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest country by population and the largest civil law
jurisdiction, has embarked on sweeping legal, political, and institutional reform in the ten years
since the collapse of authoritarian rule. Half way around the world from the U.S., Indonesia is
virtually unknown to Western legal scholars, yet the changes being made in Indonesian criminal
procedure are fundamental: establishing a suspect’s right to remain silent; limiting pretrial de-
tention; requiring police/prosecutor cooperation; liberalizing the rules of evidence; introducing
guilty pleas and cooperating defendants; and replacing inquisitorial trial and pretrial procedures
with adversarial ones. This process illustrates the enormous potential for code-based criminal pro-
cedure reform and its capacity to introduce new concepts into a criminal justice system, but its
success requires legal actors to accept and internalize an entirely new conceptualization of their
roles. (P)This Article places the transformation of the Indonesian criminal procedure within the
larger context of overall Indonesian legal reform as well as the widespread efforts to modernize
criminal procedure codes throughout the civil law world. It is not limited to examining the final
result, but also describes how and why particular results were reached – the sources the drafting
team relied upon, the evolution of the code during the drafting process, and the motivations of
drafting members in reaching particularly results. This Article pulls together a number of different
important areas of current scholarship – comparative criminal procedure, international technical
assistance, and post-authoritarian reform – in a reader-accessible case study format.
"MORE ADVERSARIAL, BUT NOT
COMPLETELY ADVERSARIAL":




The criminal procedure code is the backbone of any crimi-
nal justice system. This is particularly true in civil law countries
where it is the code, rather than judicial precedent and court-
drafted rules, that defines the legal rights of the accused and the
relationship between different judicial participants. By setting
down the rules, the code helps to establish the underlying legal
culture and expectations of the participants and shapes the de-
velopment of the legal institutions involved in the criminal jus-
tice system. The civil law tradition, however, has been seen as
more rigid than the common law system because it deprives
judges of the capacity to shape procedures in response to new
facts and developments.
This perception is wrong. The very code-based systems that
are less flexible in the short term have proven to be more capa-
ble than common law systems of adopting broad new legal para-
digms over time. The reform process may take several years, but
the results have been dramatic: a number of civil law countries
have achieved remarkable transformations of their criminal jus-
tice system over the past few decades, including the adoption of
many adversarial features.'
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1. See, e.g., Ennio Amodio, The Accusatorial System Lost and Regained: Reforming Crim-
inal Procedure in Italy, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 489 (2004); Maximo Langer, Revolution in
Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 Am. J.
COMP. L. 617, 618 (2007) [hereinafter Revolution] (noting that fourteen Latin American
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Different agents of change are responsible for this hybrid
criminal justice system in code-based countries. First, there is
genuine dissatisfaction with the formalistic procedures of the
civil law tradition and a greater need for efficiency to confront
rising crime rates.2 Second, the perceived need to combat or-
ganized crime, terrorism, corruption, and other crimes has led
countries to adopt new specialized criminal procedures that sub-
sequently migrated into the general criminal procedure code.3
Third, decreased tolerance for domestic historical abuses, such
as coerced confessions and arbitrary detention, has motivated
countries to alter procedures, giving defendants greater rights to
challenge the government's case.4 Fourth, international proce-
dural norms embodied in human rights conventions, especially
those contained in the International Convention of Civil and Po-
litical Rights ("ICCPR") and the Convention on Torture have
spurred domestic procedural reforms.5 Fifth, internal institu-
tional rivalries, particularly over the control of the investigation
countries have introduced new and more adversarial criminal procedure codes over
past fifteen years); Michael J. Spence, The Complexity of Success: The U.S. Role in Russian
Criminal Procedure Reform, 60 CARNEGIE PAPERS 3, 3-4 (2005), available at http://carnegie
endowment.org/pubs.
2. See, e.g., Marco W. Fabri, Commentary, Due Process in the Americas, 40 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 1045, 1046 (1996) (noting that Italy's criminal procedure reform was driven in
part by a goal of greater efficiency); Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal
Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARv. INT'L LJ. 1, 37-38 (2004) [hereinafter Transplants to Translations]
(noting that law countries adopt plea bargaining to respond to rising crime rates).
3. See, e.g., Michael R. Pahl, Wanted: Criminal Justice-Colombia's Adoption of a
Prosecutorial System of Criminal Procedure, 16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 608, 616 (1993) (special-
ized criminal procedures were narcotics driven).
4. See, e.g., Christopher Lehmann, Bail Reform in Ukraine: Transplanting Western Le-
gal Concepts to Post-Soviet Legal Systems, 13 HARV. Hum. RTS. J. 191, 193 (2002) (address-
ing abuse of pretrial detention); Leonard Orland, A Russian Legal Revolution: The 2002
Criminal Procedure Code, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 133, 134-36 (2002) (addressing abuse of
power by police and prosecutors); Leonard L. Cavise, The Transition from the Inquisitorial
to the Accusatorial System of Trial: Procedure: Why Some Latin American Laryers Hesitate 16-
18 (Berkeley Elec. Press, Working Paper No. 1552, 2006), available at http://law.
bepress.com/expresso/eps/1552 (addressing abuse of arbitrary judges).
5. See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure
in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 823-45 (2000) (describing role of interna-
tional agreements and organizations in shaping criminal procedure reform); Mark Ber-
ger, Europeanizing Self-Incrimination: The Right to Remain Silent in the European Court of
Human Rights, 12 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 339, 342 (2006) (describing role of European Court
of Human Rights in establishing right against self incrimination in its member states);
Spence, supra note 1, at 14 (influence of European Convention on Human Rights on
Russian criminal procedure reform). But see Lehmann, supra note 4, at 192 (question-
ing Ukrainian rhetoric in meeting standards of Council of Europe). Ultimately, how-
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stage, are leading to procedural changes.6 Sixth, the exper-
iences and assumptions of countries that are actively promoting
criminal justice reform abroad are reflected in the codes
adopted by countries receiving technical assistance.7 Finally, re-
gional adoption of new procedures has developed further mo-
mentum toward reform in neighboring countries.
Code-based reform is not the only model for change. Com-
mon law systems are capable of criminal procedure reform
through judicial decisionmaking; the Warren Court in the
United States during the 1960s bears witness to this potential.9
There are benefits to the common law approach-changes are
developed by judges based on the concrete experience of real
cases over time, rather than untested legal theory. But there are
also significant drawbacks to this approach. When a common
law system effects such a criminal procedure transformation
through constitutional interpretation by the courts, options are
limited by the text of the constitution. Furthermore, constitu-
tionally-grounded judicial decisions, once made, can limit fur-
ther innovation.'0
By bringing about transformational changes to their legal
ever, the decisions of these supranational bodies may serve to constrain future reforms
by elevating particular procedures to the level of human rights.
6. See Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Chile: Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems:
The Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM.
323, 329 (1998) (discussing high risks of conflict between prosecutors andjudges); Leh-
mann, supra note 4, at 192 (shifting pretrial detention power from prosecutors to
judges); Spence, supra note 1, at 4 (shifting supervisory authority over investigations
from prosecutors to judges).
7. See Revolution, supra note 1, at 647-51 (descrbing role of the United States
Agency for International Development ("USAID") in Latin American criminal proce-
dure reform). The efficacy of this model of technical foreign assistance has faced sig-
nificant criticism. See generally Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Rich-
ard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003) (examining past failures to
transfer foreign legal systems and laws to other countries); Jacques deLisle, Lex Ameri-
cana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-
Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 182-83 (1999) (exploring
exportation of U.S. legal models to other countries).
8. See Revolution, supra note 1, at 626 (describing how Latin American reform
movement diffused within region).
9. See Darryl K. Brown, Reform of Criminal Procedure in the States: The Warren Court,
Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1411, 1411-
13 (2002).
10. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversaiy Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 403, 487-88 (1992) (noting that constitutionalized criminal procedure
constrains further experimentation).
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systems through legislation, civil law countries enjoy a political
advantage over common law nations. The consensus-building
legislative process can make the procedural reforms more read-
ily accepted by legal institutions and actors, particularly where
they are represented in the drafting process, than changes
brought about through the courts."1
Code reform enjoys the capacity to produce change in a
freer and more holistic manner, rather than piecemeal by prece-
dent. Significant procedural changes generate resistance. Insti-
tutions will perceive that their authority or independence is
threatened or diminished by reform. The code-drafting process,
however, offers the potential of something for everyone.1 2 Pack-
aging all changes into a single new code can avoid intermediate
forms of procedural rules that are not viable or are rejected by
self-interested institutions because the benefits of a particular
change to the institution are not apparent in isolation."i
Code-based change allows its proponents to seek to trans-
form the legal culture. It can directly and systemically alter the
mindset of the legal elites through the creation of new para-
digms that require legal actors to accept and internalize a new
conceptualization of their roles. By using a "total immersion"
approach, it can challenge legal actors to do more than simply
translate reforms back into their existing conceptual framework.
The result of this capacity for change is an emerging system
of criminal justice in civil law countries-a code-based system of
11. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 9, at 1414-15, 1427 (attributing lack of societal ac-
ceptance of Warren Court decisions revolutionizing U.S. criminal procedure to their
non-legislative origin); Transplants to Translations, supra note 2, at 49 (noting that Italy's
adoption of plea bargaining was by statute and enjoyed more political support than the
judicially-created plea bargaining system that arose in Germany). The U.S. legal system
has been capable of adopting codes to replace common law development, such as the
1972 adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but these codes have typically served
primarily to codify existing common law rules rather than to transform the criminal
justice system into something new. See Roger C. Park & Michael]. Saks, Evidence Scholar-
ship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 46 B.C. L. REV. 949, 954 (2006).
12. For example, during the Russian criminal procedure reform process in 2001,
the Russian Procuracy surrendered its authority over the issuance of search and arrest
warrants, but gained greater control over the investigation as part of the bargain. Re-
cent changes, however, have stripped the Procuracy of its authority to investigate. See
William Burnham & Thomas Firestone, Investigation of Criminal Cases Under the Rus-
sian Criminal Procedure Code 14-21 (Oct. 29, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
13. See Van Kessel, supra note 10, at 523-24 (noting dangers of half steps in chang-
ing U.S. criminal procedure).
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criminal procedure with adversarial features. 4 Some observers
may see criminal procedure reform as a process of moving to-
ward a more adversarial model, 5 others see the process more as
one of convergence of common law and criminal law systems.' 6
Convergence suggests a coming together of two systems-al-
though the United States will not likely consciously adopt signifi-
cant new inquisitorial features into its criminal justice system any
time soon due to its strong historical hostility to the inquisitorial
system, other common law countries may be more willing to ex-
periment.'7
This Article examines the efforts to transform the criminal
procedure in the largest civil law country in the world-the Re-
public of Indonesia. Indonesia, the world's fourth largest coun-
try by population and the largest civil law jurisdiction, has em-
barked on program of reformasi-sweeping legal, political, and
institutional reform during the ten years since the collapse of
authoritarian rule in Indonesia in 1998.18 Half-way around the
world, Indonesia is virtually unknown to Western legal scholars,
yet the changes being made in Indonesian criminal procedure
are fundamental: establishing a suspect's right to remain si-
lent;19 limiting pretrial detention;2' requiring police/prosecutor
14. See generally Amodio, supra note 1; Langer, supra note 1, Spence, supra note 1.
15. See, e.g., Cavise, supra note 4, at 1.
16. See, e.g., Amann, supra note 5, at 818-45.
17. See Stephen C. Thaman, A Comparative Approach to Teaching Criminal Procedure
and its Application to the Post-Investigative Stage, 56J. LEGAL EDUC. 459, 462 (2006) [here-
inafter Comparative Approach] (describing rise of nativist sentiment toward comparative
criminal procedure in the United States); Van Kessel, supra note 10, at 410, 504 (observ-
ing United States' "worship of the adversary structure [and] our reactionary distaste for
anything characterized as inquisitory," and arguing that this strictly adversarial system
relegates the American trial judge to simply "referee" a trial). This should hardly be
surprising for a country that has successfully fought off the adoption of that other Na-
poleonic uber system-the metric system. The United Kingdom, by comparison, faces
pressure to harmonize its system with the civil law countries of the European Union
("E.U."), and it will most likely do so through a legislative, code-based solution. See
Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International
Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 46-49 (noting development of inquisitorial procedures
within English criminal justice system).
18. See PETRA STOCKMANN, INDONESIAN REFORMASI AS REFLECTED IN LAW: CHANGE
& CONTINUITY IN PosT-SuHARTo ERA LEGISLATION ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 1 (2004).
19. See Draft of Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana [Draft Criminal Pro-
cedure Code], arts. 22(1), 90 (Sep. 8, 2008) [hereinafter DRAFr KUHAP] (on file with
Fordham International Law Journal). The proposed Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum
Acara Pidana ("KUHAP") has gone through several draft versions. Unless otherwise
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cooperation;2 1 liberalizing the rules of evidence; 22 introducing
guilty pleas and cooperating defendants; 23 and replacing inquisi-
torial trial and pretrial procedures with adversarial ones.
24
This Article provides a perspective not normally available to
U.S. legal scholars in the area of comparative law; it is a firsthand
account of criminal procedure reform as it occured. It focuses
not only on examining the result, but also on how and why par-
ticular results were reached-the sources that the criminal pro-
cedure drafting team relied upon, the evolution of the code dur-
ing the debating and drafting process, and the motivations of
the team in reaching those results. It also places the transforma-
tion of Indonesian criminal procedure within the larger context
of overall Indonesian reform and the widespread efforts to mod-
ernize criminal procedure code in civil law countries. The Indo-
nesian criminal procedure reform process directly illustrates the
enormous potential for code-based criminal procedure reform
and its capacity to introduce new paradigms into a criminal jus-
tice system.
I. THE DUTCH CIVIL LAW INHERITANCE
One of the primary legal developments during the medieval
period in Europe was the emergence of the civil law system. This
system, first adopted in Continental Europe and later spread to
many of former European colonies, has been characterized as
inquisitorial due to its historical development from Roman Cath-
olic canon law.25 Its classical components involved the establish-
ment of a judicial state official-an investigating magistrate-
who replaced the victim or the victim's family. 26 This medieval
judicial official conducted the questioning of witnesses, the tor-
noted, this Article will refer to the most recent version of the draft, which was approved
by the Minister of Law and Human Rights on September 8, 2008.
20. See id. arts. 59 (5) (c), 60.
21. See id. arts. 8(1), 13, 15.
22. See id. arts. 83, 175-76.
23. See id. arts. 113, 199, 200.
24. See id. arts. 150, 154, 176, 178.
25. See Stephen C. Thaman, Doctrinal Issues in Penal Court Procedures, in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY. AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 1096, 1096-97 (David S.
Clark ed., 2007) [hereinafter Doctrinal Issues].
26. See id. at 1096 (describing replacement of adversarial system by Roman Catho-
lic canon law and rediscovery of Roman law in Continental countries).
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ture of the defendant, and the other investigative acts. 2 7 The
investigating magistrate reduced his results to writings placed in
the dossier.28 The written contents of the dossier became the
exclusive basis upon which the defendant's guilt or innocence
was determined, without a public trial based on oral testimony.29
Therefore the formal procedures by which the dossier's contents
were gathered and memorialized during the official investiga-
tion became the de facto rules of evidence. 0 Once properly en-
tered into the dossier, these reports and documents were effec-
tively "in evidence."31 During the Napoleonic reforms, torture
was formally eliminated and the public trial was restored in
many civil law countries, but the dossier system with its written
results of the formal official investigation has continued in civil
law countries.32 At trial, the judge continues to rely heavily upon
the written reports of the dossier or the public reading of its
contents as evidence rather than the oral testimony of witnesses
at trial. 3
Like many other former colonies of Continental Europe, In-
donesia generally follows the civil law tradition. During the colo-
nial period, the Dutch maintained a dual criminal justice system
within Indonesia-one court system for the Dutch and other for-
eigners living in the colony and a second court system for indige-
nous Indonesians, the pribumi 4 Judges within the court system
for Europeans applied the Reglement op de Strafvording,"5 which
closely followed the criminal procedure code in the Nether-
lands, while in the indigenous local courts, Indonesian judges
27. See Comparative Approach, supra note 17, at 465.
28. See Erik Luna, A Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 277,
297 (2004).
29. See Doctrinal Issues, supra note 25, at 1097.
30. See Comparative Approach, supra note 17, at 464-65.
31. See Doctrinal Issues, supra note 25, at 1097.
32. See id. at 1097-98.
33. See Annemarieke Beijer, Cathy Cobley & Andr6 Klip, Witness Evidence, Article 6
of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Principle of Open Justice, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 281, 287 (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995) (ex-
plaining that Dutch "courts base their judgments . . . mainly on the dossier, which
contains the results of the pre-trial investigation" and the trial is more a "verification of
the results of the prior stages than an active inquiry" of its own); Rudolph B. Schles-
inger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L.
REv. 361, 365-67 (1977).
34. See SEBASTIAAN POMPE, THE INDONESIAN SUPREME COURT: A STUDY OF INsTITU-
TIONAL COLLAPSE 28-34 (2005).
35. See id. at 28 n.62.
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applied a slightly looser version of Dutch procedure, codified in
1848 as the Inlandsch Reglement,3 6 and later revised in 1941 as the
Herzien Inlandsch Reglement." During the Japanese occupation,
the dual court systems were finally abandoned, and the now
renamed Herzien Indonesisch Reglement became the national crimi-
nal procedure code.3" Following independence, in 1951, Indo-
nesia formally adopted the Herziene Inlandsch Reglement, translat-
ing the code into the Indonesian national language, Bahasa Indo-
nesia, essentially without change.:
In 1981, Indonesia enacted the current criminal procedure
code, Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana ("KUHAP").40
The KUHAP continues to reflect the Dutch legacy of criminal
procedure although it adds some adversarial features.41 Overall,
it takes a highly formalized approach to the justice system and
strongly compartmentalizes the criminal process into three dis-
tinct stages-investigation, prosecution, and adjudication, led by
the police, the prosecution, and the judge, respectively.42
A. The Investigation
The investigation is controlled by the police.43 Like some
other civil law countries, Indonesia has abandoned the investi-
gating magistrate.4 4 Unlike most civil law jurisdictions that have
36. See id. at 28 n.63.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 28 n.63, 178.
39. See KITAB UNDANG-UNDANG HUKUM AcARA PIDANA [Code of Criminal Proce-
dure] Elucidations I-1, Law 8/1981 (Indon.) [hereinafter KUHAP]; POMPE, supra note
34, at 47 (describing transition of criminal procedure following independence).
40. See generally KUHAP, supra note 39, pmbl. For an outline of the 1981 KUHAP's
principles and objectives, see KUHAP, supra note 39, Elucidations 1-3, 1-4.
41. See generally INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 87-98 (Supreme Court of Indonesia &
University of Indonesia eds., 2005) (describing history of criminal procedure during
colonial, early national and KUHAP periods).
42. See KUHAP, supra note 39, arts. 1(2)-(8).
43. See id. arts. 1(l)-(2).
44. During the Dutch colonial period, a native Indonesian prosecutor worked
under the supervision of the judge, but this system was finally abolished in 1951. See
POMPE, supra note 34, at 46-47. Civil law countries are, on the whole, generally moving
away from the investigating magistrate model. For example, in France, Spain, and the
Netherlands, magistrates with investigatory authority continue to exist, but they are
used in only a small percentage of cases. The Dutch are considering ending the process
of a judicial investigation. See A.H.J. Swart, Netherlands, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 279, 298 (Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed., 1993). In
Italy, Germany, and many Latin American countries, magistrates no longer lead investi-
gations-magistrates now focus exclusively on judicial functions such as determining
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eliminated the investigating magistrates, however, the prosecu-
tors do not have a recognized role during the investigative stage
except in corruption and human rights cases.45 Instead, the po-
lice conduct the official investigation and prepare the official in-
vestigative dossier with little prosecutorial or judicial oversight.46
Under the current KUHAP, the investigation stage itself is
formally divided into preliminary and formal investigation
phases.47 During the preliminary investigation, the 'junior" in-
vestigator determines whether a crime has taken place.4 8 This
stage most closely resembles an "inquest" used for certain types
of crime in some common law countries.49
Based on the preliminary investigation findings, the case
can progress to the formal investigation stage. 50  Here, the
KUHAP assigns a central role to the dossier. During the formal
investigation, the investigator summons the suspect for examina-
tion, examines witnesses with personal knowledge, including wit-
nesses proposed by the accused, conducts searches and seizures,
requests expert reports, and conducts other investigative ac-
tions.5' The investigator then places all resulting witness state-
ments, reports and seized documents in the dossier. 52 The inves-
tigator is permitted to order pretrial detention of the suspect for
up to twenty days, which the prosecutor may subsequently ex-
the legality of the investigatory actions taken by the police and/or prosecutors (e.g.,
searches and arrests), preserving testimony through depositions, and determining the
admissibility of evidence. See Micah S. Myers, Note, Prosecuting Human Rights Violations in
Europe and America: How Legal System Structure Affects Compliance with International Obliga-
tions, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 211, 250-52 (2003); Doctrinal Issues, supra note 25, at 1099.
Switzerland currently uses a mixed system that makes use of investigating judges in
certain cantons and not in others. See Federal Office of Justice (Switzerland), Criminal
Law and Law of Criminal Procedure Unit, http://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/die_
oe/organisation/dbstrafrecht.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2007). However, Switzerland
plans to abolish the investigating judge in 2010 when it establishes a single code of
criminal procedure at the federal level. SeeJohn D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay
Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 119 (2006).
45. Prior to the enactment of the KUHAP, prosecutors enjoyed a greater role in
conducting the investigation. See INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 89-90, 110.
With the enactment of the KUHAP in 1981, Indonesian prosecutors retained only the
authority to investigate "special crimes"-corruption. See id. at 90.
46. See id. at 90.
47. See KUHAP, supra note 39, arts. 1(5), 102-08.
48. See id. arts. 102-05.
49. See Doctrinal Issues, supra note 25, at 1097.
50. See KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 1(5).
51. See id. arts. 1(2), 112-21.
52. See id. art. 8(1).
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tend for an additional forty days, all without judicial involve-
ment.
53
Indonesia's adoption of the traditional civil law approach
has meant that few rights of the defendant are clearly articulated
in the KUHAP. The KUHAP fails to make clear a right against
self-incrimination or a standard of proof that protects the pre-
sumption of innocence. Equally importantly, there is no regular
judicial avenue at the pretrial stage to assert that rights have
been violated by the police or seek appropriate deterrent reme-
dies such as suppression of illegally-obtained evidence. 4
Instead, the KUHAP places limits on the powers of the po-
lice by formally identifying what steps investigators are author-
ized to take, rather than allowing them to investigate in any man-
ner not otherwise prohibited. As a result, rights are routinely
violated, but there is no realistic avenue for redress. The quality
of the police investigation also suffers-without express legal au-
thority to conduct certain covert police activities55 Indonesian
police are reluctant to either engage, or seek to use at trial, evi-
dence from covert work or cooperating defendants.
56
For example, in the area of wiretapping, Indonesia has no
general legislation authorizing the interception of telephone
conversations. 57 Nevertheless, in practice, Indonesian police are
known to conduct wiretapping without legal authority. As a re-
53. See id. art. 24.
54. The KUHAP permits the defendant to challenge his detention shortly before
trial. See id. arts. 79-81. However, by that stage the harm of pretrial detention is already
done and financial compensation is the only remedy.
55. The KUHAP provides that investigators are authorized to "take other responsi-
ble acts in accordance with law." Id. art. 7(1)(0). The KUHAP's official commentary
defines such other acts to mean, "such acts that: (a) are not contrary to a rule of law;
(b) are consistent with the legal obligation which compels the taking of such official
acts; (c) are proper and reasonable and within the scope of his office; (d) are consid-
ered suitable in compelling circumstances; and (e) respect human rights." Id. Elucida-
tions art. 5. Despite the apparent authority to act subject to these provisions, investiga-
tors are unsure whether they have the legal authority to do so. Their cautious approach
proved justified when the Constitutional Court held that telephone interceptions with-
out express legal authority are illegal. See In re Mulyana Wirakusumah et al., Dec. No.
012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006, 73 (Const. Ct. 2006) (Indon.) (on file with Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal).
56. See Benjamin B. Wagner & Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Retooling Law Enforcement to
Investigate and Prosecute Entrenched Corruption: Key Criminal Procedure Reforms for Indonesia
and Other Nations, 180 U. PA. J. I-r'L L. 183, 184 (2008).
57. See Regulation on the Technical Aspects of Interception, Ministry of Commu-
nications and Informatics, No. ll/PER/M.KOMINFO/02/2006, pmbl. (Indon.). In
corruption cases, the Ministry of Communications promulgated regulations permitting
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suit, the police cannot include the results of their interceptions
in the dossier and any recordings cannot be later used as evi-
dence at trial-the police are limited to using the intercepts as
background criminal intelligence.8 This unregulated system
perversely means both that citizens' privacy rights are not pro-
tected and vigorous gathering of probative evidence is ham-
pered.
B. The Prosecution
The prosecution stage is similarly formalistic and compart-
mentalized. The investigator must present the dossier to the
prosecutor for examination and approval.59 The prosecutor has
seven days to study the dossier and may accept it or return it to
the investigator for further investigation.6 °
Because the police prepare the dossier without any input
from the prosecutors, the prosecutor's role is essentially limited
to either accepting or rejecting the finished product.6 1 As a re-
sult, the dossier sometimes shuttles back and forth between the
police, who believe their work is done, and the prosecutors, who
refuse to certify that the dossier is complete.62 Sometimes, the
police simply choose to drop the returned case rather than in-
vestigate it further.63
Once the dossier is formally accepted, the prosecutor
prepares a bill of indictment for submission with the dossier to
the district court for its review. 64 The indictment itself must con-
wiretapping and the use of its results in court but there is no express statutory authority
to do so. See generally id.
58. But see id. art. 17 (allowing investigators in corruption cases to use wiretap in-
formation in order to "disclose a criminal act.").
59. See KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 110(1).
60. See id. art. 138.
61. See id.; see also R.M. SURACHMAN &JAN S. MARINGKA, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS OF
INDONESIA 1-2 (2006), http://www.iap.nl.com/3rd_asia-pacific-regconf 2006/paper_
indonesia.pdf.
62. See KOMISI HUKUM NASIONAL (INDONESIA), LAW REFORM POLICIES (RECOMMEN-
DATIONS) 125 (2003) [hereinafter LAw REFORM POLICIES] ("Another problem that often
arises is the passing back and forward of case files for one reason or another . . .");
PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, REPORT OF THE GOVERNANCE AUDIT OF THE PUBLIC PROSE-
CUTION SERVICES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 102 (2001) ("Review and return of dos-
siers to investigations causes delay and may damage the working relationship between
prosecutors and investigators.").
63. See Andi Hamzah, Draft Academic Bill: Code of Criminal Procedure 21 (2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
64. See KUHAP, supra note 39, arts. 139, 143.
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tain a detailed explanation of the crime and can be altered only
one time at least seven days before the trial. There are limited
provisions forjoinder of defendants involved in a single crime-
the prosecutor must receive the dossier for each defendant at or
about the same time from the police.66 As result, defendants,
even when involved in a single conspiracy, are often charged and
tried separately,67 leading to inefficiency and potentially incon-
sistent outcomes.
Overall, although the KUHAP purported to establish Sistem
Peradilan Satu Atap ("Criminal Justice Under One Roof Sys-
tem"),6" the results have been the opposite. By establishing for-
mal stages, each with sharp time limits, during which first the
police and then the prosecutors are responsible for the case, the
KUHAP highly compartmentalizes their respective roles, with
the predictable result that the police and the prosecutors rarely
69cooperate.
C. The Trial
All Indonesian cases sent to court go to trial.7" There is no
pretrial stage where legal issues can be resolved, a system of con-
sensual resolution of criminal cases through guilty pleas, or the
use of cooperating defendants.7
The Indonesian trial, however, is often little more than a
confirmation of the contents of the investigative dossier con-
65. See id. arts. 143, 144.
66. See id. art. 141.
67. See id. art. 142.
68. INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 88.
69. See id. at 110-11 ("[T]he reality is that [the 1981 KUHAP] has resulted in an
increasing lack of cooperation between the police and prosecutors and the develop-
ment of an unhealthy institutional rivalry."); Wagner &Jacobs, supra note 56, at 201-02;
Surachman & Maringka, supra note 61, at 2.
70. See PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, supra note 62, at 102.
71. See KUHAP, supra note 39, arts. 77-83. The Indonesian police developed their
own informal plea bargaining system known as kasus cadangan ("reserve cases"). When
a person is guilty of multiple crimes but the police want to obtain their cooperation,
they seek to charge him with only one crime and save the others in reserve. If he fails to
cooperate or engages in new criminal activity, they arrest him on one of the earlier
crimes and do not have to worry about whether they have enough evidence to charge
him on his post-release activities. This charge manipulation is done without court or
prosecutor involvement. See Wagner &Jacobs, supra note 56, at 211. In one instance,
the police contacted the judge directly to object to the sentencing recommendation
made by the prosecutors to the court because they felt it was too high given the cooper-
ation provided by the defendant.
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ducted in a summary fashion.7 2 Courtroom procedures place
significant limits on the adversarial nature of the trial. Armed
with the dossier, the judge controls the order and questioning of
witnesses as in the traditional inquisitorial model.7 3 The prose-
cution and defense 74 may pose follow-up questions to the wit-
ness, but are not allowed to conduct cross-examination of wit-
nesses through leading questions.75 The judge also determines
whether expert witnesses should be called. 76  Opening state-
ments are limited to the prosecutor's reading aloud of the
lengthy indictment7 7 and closing statements involve the reading
by the parties of their respective proof and the making of sen-
tencing requests.
78
The evidentiary rules contained in the current KUHAP also
strongly reflect its Dutch roots. 79 The KUHAP recognizes only
four types of evidence-documents, witness statements, defense
statements, and expert reports.80 Circumstantial evidence may
be considered, but only if it comes from witness and defendant
testimony or documents.81 Physical evidence can be considered
by the judge in judging other evidence, 2 but is not deemed evi-
dence itself. Computer records, audio and video tapes, and
other forms of evidence falling outside this statutory framework
are not admissible. Evidence obtained abroad is also not readily
admissible. While the judge must find the defendant's guilt to a
72. In this way, Indonesia's trial procedures echo their Dutch origins. See supra
note 33 and accompanying text.
73. See KUHAP, supra note 39, arts. 160(1)(a), 160(2), 163, 165(1); see also Doctri-
nal Issues, supra note 25, at 1097 (describing general inquisitorial practice); Surachman
& Maringka, supra note 61, at 6.
74. Indonesian defendants typically appear unrepresented by legal counsel in
court. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Re-
view, Summary: Indonesia, 1 14, U.N. Doc A/HRC/WG.6/1/[IDN]/3 (Apr. 2008).
While all defendants are entitled to retain an attorney, the Government provides free
legal counsel only in cases where the potential punishment is greater than five years'
imprisonment. See KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 56; see also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RiGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RiGHTS
PRACrICES: INDONESIA §1(e) (2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/616
09.htm [hereinafter STATE DEP'T INDONESIA REPORT].
75. See KUHAP, supra note 39, arts. 165-66.
76. See id. art. 180(1).
77. See id. art. 155(2).
78. See id. art. 182(1).
79. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
80. KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 184(1).
81. See id. arts. 184(1)(d), 188.
82. See id. art. 181.
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moral certainty, the KUHAP tracks the old Dutch tradition of
permitting a judge to find the defendant guilty only if there are
at least two different categories of evidence present.8 3
As a result of the lack of opportunity to engage in advocacy
in establishing the facts, the prosecutors and defense attorneys
are typically passive in court; their role in court is confined al-
most exclusively to legal argument rather than fact development.
Instead, the verdict is determined by the judge's confirmation of
the contents of the dossier through judicial questioning of cer-
tain witnesses.8 4
Overall, this formalistic trial system leads to a quantitative
(counting of types of evidence), rather than a qualitative, deter-
mination of the weight of the evidence by the judge. It hampers
the ability of prosecutors to present important types of evidence,
such as electronic, video or audiotapes, or physical evidence.85 It
can result in acquittals where there may be strong proof of one
type, but none in one of the other categories.
II. SEEDS OF REFORM
During the colonial period and the subsequent authorita-
rian regimes of Indonesia's first two presidents, Sukarno and
Suharto, the Indonesian legal system was focused on the mainte-
83. Id. art. 183. The Dutch requirement of two types of evidence (not simply two
witnesses or two documents, but two different types of evidence) is a throwback to the
old inquisitorial rules developed in Catholic Canon law. See Comparative Approach, supra
note 17, at 464-65 (requiring certain number of eyewitnesses to prove guilt). In the
Netherlands these formalistic rules have remained part of the code, but have been
eroded in practice. See Swart, supra note 44, at 296. Elsewhere in Europe, the two types
of evidence rule was largely abolished during the Napoleonic reforms and replaced by a
"free evaluation of evidence" system where the judge finds guilt or innocence based on
all of the evidence, not on a formula for the number or types of evidence. SeeJackson &
Kovalev, supra note 44, at 108 (describing emergence of "free evaluation" system in civil
law countries).
84. Exclusive reliance on the dossier poses serious due process issues.. For exam-
ple, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the Dutch system of heavy
judicial reliance on the contents of the dossier, upon which the Indonesian system was
modeled, violates a defendant's right at trial to confront witnesses against him. See Kos-
tovski v. Netherlands, 12 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 434, 44749 (1989) (conviction based on
anonymous witness statements violated fair trial); see also European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(3) (d), Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 (recognizing right to confront witnesses); Comparative Approach, supra note
17, at 472 (noting rise of civil law jurisprudence asserting right to confrontation).
85. See Wagner & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 211-13; PRIcE WATERHOUSE COOPERS,
supra note 62, at 101 (lack of KUHAP reform has led to lack of policies on "such mat-
ters as the use of DNA evidence, videotaped examinations, or electronic documents.").
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nance of state control and national security.8 6 Indonesia's Con-
stitution recognized few individual rights; instead, it was de-
signed to maximize government power and focused on the citi-
zens' duties to the State rather than the State's protection of
citizens' rights.8 7 During the Suharto New Order era, the courts
were controlled by the executive branch."8  The current
KUHAP's non-adversarial approach supported this system of
crime control and state order, rather than ensuring due process
through balancing law enforcement's legitimate needs with indi-
vidual rights.89
With the downfall of Suharto and the collapse of the New
Order in May 1998, Indonesia entered a new reformasi era of de-
mocracy and political reform. As part of this new spirit of
reformasi, many Indonesians demanded comprehensive legal re-
form, including changes to the criminal procedure.9 Law en-
forcement officials and prosecutors have objected to Indonesia's
formalistic and compartmentalized pre-investigation, investiga-
tion, prosecution and trial stages and its limited list of admissible
evidence and proof requirements.9 ' International human rights
organizations have complained of Indonesia's failure to observe
internationally recognized rights of the accused or spell out the
consequences if they are violated.92 Reformers generally have
decried the absence of an integrated justice system other than in
86. Tim Lindsey, Indonesian Constitutional Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy, 6
SING. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 244, 251-53 (2002).
87. See id. at 253-54.
88. See INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 54-56, 107.
89. See STOCKMANN, supra note 18, at 56-57 n.6.
90. See Bagir Manan, Introduction to INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 41, at v-vi
(describing process of Indonesian legal reform); The Asia Foundation, Survey Report on
Citizens'Perceptions of the Indonesia Justice Sector 5 (2005), http://asiafoundation.org/pdf/
IndoLaw.pdf (categorizing Indonesia's "general courts" as "ineffective").
91. See INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 87-98, 110-11 (outlining re-
sponsibilities of law enforcement officials and prosecutors under KUHAP); KEJAKSAAN
REPUBLIK INDONESIA [Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia], AGENDA OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE'S REFORM 42 (2006) (describing commitment made by the
leaders of Indonesia's legal and law enforcement institutions to improve coordination
and communication within various components of criminal justice sector); PRICE
WATERHOUSE COOPERS, supra note 62, at 102-06.
92. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, Indonesia: Comments on the Draft Revised Criminal Proce-
dure Code, at 2, A] Index ASA 21/005/2006 (Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA21/005/2006 (criticizing KUHAP); ASIAN HUMAN
RIGHTS COMM'N, INDONESIA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN 2006 9 & 7 (2006), avail-
able at http://matefial.ahrchk.net/hrreport/2006/Indonesia2006.pdf (criticizing
KUHAP's detention system); see also LAW REFORM POLICIES, supra note 62, at 124-25.
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name 93
A number of factors form the groundwork for criminal pro-
cedure reform-new domestic legislation, international conven-
tions, judicial decisions, and organizational reforms.
A. Legislative Innovation and International Influences
Efforts over the past five years to revise criminal procedures
relating to specific, high-profile crimes (lex specialis) have had
the effect of preparing the legal landscape to accept broader,
more general reforms.94 For example, five specific laws-the ter-
rorism, money laundering, corruption, trafficking-in-persons
laws, and most recently the cybercrime law-have expanded the
concept of admissible evidence by adding electronic evidence to
the list of admissible evidence to prove these specific crimes.95
While this change did not alter the overall approach of formally
listing the types of evidence that can be considered at trial, these
five laws reflected a willingness of Indonesian legal experts to
accept that the rules of evidence needed to be revised to in-
crease flexibility.96
A sixth law, the Witness Protection Law of 2006,"7 set the
stage for the introduction of the concept of cooperating defend-
ants ("crown witnesses"). This law, which was designed initially
93. See LAW REFORM POLICIES, supra note 62, at 112-15, 122-25; Andi Hamzah,
(Civil) Servant Investigator Based on KUHAP (Criminal Procedure Code) and Certain Law 1
(Kumdang Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, KUHAP Draft Socialization Working
Paper, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hamzah Working Paper].
94. See Tim Lindsey, Legal Infrastructure and Governance Reform in Post-Crisis Asia:
The Case of Indonesia, in LAw REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES 3, 14-24
(Tim Lindsey ed., 2007).
95. See Undang-Undang Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Perdagangan
Orang [Law on Elimination of Trafficking in Persons] art. 29, Law 21/2007, available at
http://www.legalitas.org/database/puu/2007/uu2l-2007.pdf; Regulations in Lieu of
Law on Eradication of Terrorism art. 27, No. 1/2002 (Indon.); Undang-Undang
Tentang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang [Law Concerning the Crime of Money Laun-
dering) art. 38, Law 15/2002, available at http://www.legalitas.org/database/puu/
2002/uul5-2002.pdf; Undang-Undang Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang
Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi [Amendment
to Law on Corruption Offenses] art. 26A, Law 20/2001, available at http://wvw.legal-
itas.org/database/puu/2001/uu2-2001.pdf; Undang-Undang Tentang Informasi Dan
Transaksi Elektronik [Law on Electronic Information and Transaction] art. 44(b), Law
11/2008, available at http://www.legalitas.org/database/puu/2008/uul 1-2008.pdf.
96. See, e.g., Tony Hotland, Rules of Evidence Cause Snags in Logging Cases, JAKARTA
POST, Apr. 28. 2004, at 4.
97. Law on Witnesses and Victims Protection, Law 13/2006 (Indon.), available at
http://www.legalitas.org/database/puu/2006/uul 3-2006eng.pdf.
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to focus on protecting victims, was expanded to encourage whis-
tle-blowing, particularly in corruption cases.9" With respect to
cooperating defendants, the law provides that while a "witness
who is also an offender in the same case cannot be released from
any legal charges if he/she is proven legally and convincingly
guilty; nevertheless, his/her testimony can be used by the judge
as a consideration to lessen the sentence."99 Similarly, a draft
amendment to Indonesia's corruption law proposes even more
explicit benefit to cooperating defendants.0 0 While still requir-
ing that the cooperating defendant stand trial rather than plead
guilty in anticipation of future cooperation, this draft provision
reflects the willingness to reward cooperation with sentence miti-
gation, a form of plea bargaining.
International conventions have also advanced the cause of
criminal procedure reform in Indonesia. 1° ' For example, in
2005, Indonesia ratified the ICCPR, which obligates Indonesia to
amend its domestic procedures to satisfy the requirement of the
ICCPR.1 0 2 Article Nine of the ICCPR requires that " [a]nyone
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
98. See Tony Hotland, Witness Protection Law "Crucial, "JAKARTA POST, July 12, 2005,
at 4.
99. See Law on Witnesses and Victims Protection art. 10(2), Law 13/2006 (Indon.),
available at http://www.legalitas.org/database/puu/20O6/uul3-2006eng.pdf, see also
Wagner & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 51-52 (proposing separate law that specifically de-
fines and protects whistle-blowers).
100. This cooperating defendant ("crown witness") provision has been proposed
as part of Indonesia's efforts to comply with Article 37 of the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Corruption ("UNCAC"), which was ratified by Indonesia in 2006. See Law
Concerning Ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Law 7/
2006, available at http://www.legalitas.org/database/puu/2006/uu7-2006eng.pdf
[hereinafter UNCAC]; United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 37, U.N.
Doc. A/58/422 (Dec. 9, 2003), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004), available at http://www.
unodc.org/pdf/crime/conventioncorruption/signing/Convention-e.pdf; see also COR-
RUPTION ERADICATION COMMISSION, IDENTIFICATION OF THE GAP BETWEEN LAwS/REGuLA-
TIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
CORRUPTION 125 (2006), http://kpk.go.id/modules/wmpdownloads/files/UNCAC_
Gap.pdf.
101. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 6-9 (noting role of international conventions in
spurring criminal procedure reform in Indonesia).
102. See Undang-Undang Tentang Pengesahan Kovenan Internasional Tentang
Hak-Hak Sipil Dan Politik [Law on Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights], Law 12/2005 (Indon.), available at http://www.legalitas.org/data
base/puu/2005/uu12-2005.pdf; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"), G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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exercise judicial power, '"103 a provision that has generally been
interpreted to mean within a "few days."10 4 Thus, even under a
very generous interpretation of the "margin of appreciation"
doctrine, 1°5 Indonesia's twenty days of detention withoutjudicial
review for defendants as permitted under the current KUHAP is
not in compliance with the speedy presentment requirement of
Article 9 of the ICCPR.10 6
Beyond these reforms themselves, one of the characteristics
of the Indonesian legal community is the small size of the expert
legislative drafting community-many of the legal scholars and
government officials authoring the anti-corruption and money
laundering laws, for example, also serve on the committee to re-
vise the KUHAP.t°7 Through these shared experiences, the au-
thors of the legislative reforms are sensitized to some of the chal-
lenges, open to outside experience and more comfortable with
new norms. As a result, they have become a central part of the
103. ICCPR art. 9(3).
104. See U.N. Secretariat, International Human Rights Instruments: Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies 131, 1 2, U.N. Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004); see also Brogan v.
United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 117, 135-36 (1989) (holding that four days
and six hours violates ICCPR); McLawrence v. Jamaica, Judgments Hum. Rts. Comm.,
No. 702, at *7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/702/1996 (1997), available at http://www.
umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/702-1996.html (holding that one week delay violates
ICCPR).
105. The "margin of appreciation" gives ratifying nations a margin to vary their
implementation of U.N. conventions to meet local circumstances. See Gerald L.
Neuman, Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law: The Uses of Interna-
tional Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 87 n.29 (2004).
106. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Promotion and Protection of all Human
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Develop-
ment: Mission to Indonesia 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/3/Add.7 (Mar. 10, 2008) (prepared by
Manfred Nowak) (recommending Indonesia reduce "time limits in police custody to 48
hours in accordance with international standards."). Indonesia first recognized the
need to place limitations on pretrial detention without judicial review in its new cyber-
crime law, which was influenced by the time limits contained in the proposed Draft
KUHAP circulating at the time. See Undang-Undang Tentang Informasi Dan Transaksi
Elektronik [Law on Electronic Information and Transaction] art. 43(6), Law 11/2008,
available at http://www.legalitas.org/database/puu/2008/uul 1-2008.pdf (requiring ju-
dicial review within twenty-four hours of suspects accused of violating new cybercrime
law).
107. See generally Tentang Perubahan Atas Keputusan Menteri Hukum Kan Hak
Asasi Manusia Tentang Pembentukan Panitia Penyusunan Rancangan [Order of Minis-
try of Law and Human Rights Regarding Membership of Committee to Revise the Crim-
inal Procedure Code] (Apr. 11, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Order of Min-
istry].
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driving force toward broader criminal procedure change.'0 8
Of course, not every legal change in Indonesia has necessa-
rily advanced criminal procedure reform. The Terrorism Law,
enacted following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United
States, liberalized the types of evidence that can be considered at
trial, but also extended the period of pretrial detention without
judicial review for defendants accused of terrorism to seven days
of initial detention followed by up to six months of detention to
permit the completion of the investigation. 10 9
B. Institutional Reforms
Existing institutions (or lack of institutions) matter greatly
when the adoption of adversarial or inquisitorial features are
under consideration.110 Institutionally, Indonesia has changed
in a manner that makes the adoption and acceptance of new
procedures more feasible.
1. The Judiciary
In March 2004, the Supreme Court assumed all organiza-
tional, administrative, and financial responsibility for the court
system from the Department of Justice and Human Rights."'
This change provided Indonesia with an independent judiciary
that it had previously lacked. By making the judges independent
108. For a discussion of the importance of individual legal reformers in criminal
procedure change, see Revolution, supra note 1, at 653-55.
109. See Regulations in Lieu of Law on Eradication of Terrorism arts. 25(2), 28,
No. 1/2002 (Indon.); see also Sidney Jones, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human
Rights in Indonesia 3 (Dec. 4, 2006) (paper submitted to Int'l Comm'n of Jurists),
http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/ICGSubmission.pdf (analyzing procedural changes brought
about by 2002 anti-terrorism law). Indonesia, of course, is not alone in passing laws to
combat terrorism that alter procedural norms that may appear inconsistent with the
ICCPR. See generally Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law and the War on Terror-
ism, 31 DENyv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 58 (2002) (describing U.S. counter-terrorism laws).
110. In Russia, for example, the Duma working group drafting its new criminal
procedure code considered establishing investigative judges based on the French
model, but concluded that it would not fit with the existing highly independent
Procuracy inherited from Soviet and tsarist days. They likewise decided to maintain the
unitary official inquisitorial investigation model out of concern that the criminal de-
fense bar did not yet have the skills or the resources to conduct their own parallel
investigations.
111. See generally Undang-Undang Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang
Nomor 14 Tabun 1970 Tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman
[Law on Amendment of Law No. 14 of 1970], Law 35/1999 (Indon.); see also INDONE-
SIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 55.
2008] THE INDONESIAN CRIMJNAL PROCEDURE CODE 207
of the executive, it lessened the judges' instinct to view them-
selves as simply part of the law enforcement apparatus."1 2
In addition, in 2003, Indonesia established a separate Con-
stitutional Court with jurisdiction over constitutional ques-
tions." 13 By establishing this specialized court, Indonesia created
a forum that could focus on the violation of individual rights.
Two recent judicial decisions by the Constitutional Court illus-
trate its role in promoting the need for criminal procedure re-
form.
In December 18, 2006, the Constitutional Court held that
wiretapping in the absence of express statutory authority is ille-
gal.114 The Court went further, outlining requirements for a
constitutionally sufficient wiretap law including requiring judi-
cial authority and setting necessary standards if the Government
wished to continue using such evidence in the future.11
Second, the Constitutional Court addressed the issue of
whether detention itself under the KUHAP was a violation of
human rights. 16 While finding that detention was a necessary
limitation on the liberty of the accused, the Court explicitly en-
couraged the need for criminal procedure reform and recog-
nized the ongoing efforts already underway:
Considering whereas according to the expert Prof. Dr. Andi
Hamzah, S.H., the KUHAP Renewal Team will make improve-
ment by establishing commissioner judges so that the rights
of defendants or suspects will be protected better .... "'
[Therefore] it is clear that the existence of ... detention can-
112. See SUPREME COURT OF INDONESIA, BLUEPRINT FOR THE REFORM OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF INDONESIA 7-11 (2003).
113. See Megawati Signs Constitutional Court Bill into Law, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 14,
2003, at 4, available at http://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/southeastasia/indonesia/
netnews/2003/ind_32v7.htm.
114. See In re Mulyana Wirakusumah, Dec. No. 012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006 (Const.
Ct. 2006) (Indon.) (on file with Fordham International Law Journal).
115. See id. at 73. Four months after the Constitutional Court's decision, Indone-
sia's legislature enacted a law explicitly authorizing court-approved wiretaps in human
trafficking cases. See Undang-Undang Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Perda-
gangan Orang [Law on Elimination of Trafficking in Persons] art. 31, Law 21/2007
(Indon.), available at http://www.legalitas.org/database/puu/2007/uu2l-2007.pdf.
116. See In re H. Suwarna Abdul Fatah, Dec. No. 018/PUU-IV/2006 8-10 (Const.
Ct. 2006) (Indon.) (on file with Fordham International Law Journal).
117. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 10-11, 34-40. Professor Andi Hamzah of
Trisakti University is the head of the Indonesian interagency working group established
to reform the criminal procedure code.
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not be removed from criminal procedure law.
1 1 8
2. The Attorney General's Office
The Indonesian Attorney General's Office ("AGO") is bet-
ter positioned to adopt more adversarial proceedings than in
many other civil law countries because the AGO is already inde-
pendent'19 and not part of the judiciary. As a result, Indonesian
prosecutors can more readily view their role as being a party in a
criminal dispute, rather than simply being officials within the in-
quisitorial system.12 0
In addition, Indonesian legal theory accepts the "opportu-
nity principle"-a prosecutor has the discretion to decline to
prosecute or may terminate a case if the case is not deemed in
the public interest. 12' This principle contrasts with the "legality
principle" of the orthodox inquisitorial model where
prosecutorial discretion is an anathema and trial is required to
"seek the ultimate truth.' 1 2 2 The opportunity principle offers
the possibility that prosecutors view themselves as parties to a
dispute, which makes the adoption of other adversarial features,
such as consensual resolution of criminal cases through plea bar-
gaining, more acceptable within the legal community. 123
Prosecutorial discretion in Indonesia, however, exists far
more in theory than in reality. Concerns of endemic
prosecutorial corruption in Indonesia have placed both legal
118. In re Fatah, Dec. No. 018/PUU-IV/2006 at 20-21.
119. See INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 89. The Indonesian Attorney
General occupies a cabinet-level position separate from the Minister of Law and
Human Rights. Id.
120. See Transplants to Translations, supra note 2, at 57 n.58 (noting Italian prosecu-
tors and judges are both members of judiciary, reflecting obstacle to adopting more
adversarial model, whereas Argentine prosecutors and judges are separate, potentially
moving Argentine system toward an adversarial model).
121. See Law on the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Indonesia art. 35(c),
Elucidations art. 35(c), Law 16/2004, available at http://www.legalitas.org/database/
puu/2004/uul6-2004eng.pdf; see also INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 89.
This principle was first established in the civil law system in Germany. See Markus Dirk
Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49
STAN. L. REV. 547, 575-76 (1997). It was later adopted by the Dutch. See Swart, supra
note 44, at 294-95.
122. See Stephen C. Thaman, Legality and Discretion, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
SOCIETY. AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, 944, 945 (David S. Clark ed., 2007).
123. See Transplants to Translations, supra note 2, at 57 (noting that in Argentina,
opportunity principle-which has been lauded because criminal courts operate more
efficiently-fosters development towards adversarial model).
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and institutional limitations on such unfettered discretion.
There is little room for dismissing even inconsequential cases.
As a result, Indonesian prosecutorial policy is that "all cases in
which the investigators have accumulated sufficient evidence will
be prosecuted." 124
3. The Indonesian National Police
The Indonesian National Police ("INP") has also under-
gone a significant change. During the New Order era, the INP
was incorporated into the armed forces with disastrous results
for law enforcement.1 25 In 1999, however, the police and the
military were separated. 1 26 This institutional reform has allowed
the police to develop into a more professional, civilian force fo-
cused on conducting criminal investigations in a domestic role,
rather than part of a military force designed to preserve state
authority. Much work, however, is still needed. 127
III. TRANFORMATION OF THE KUHAP
Despite the general dissatisfaction with the 1981 KUHAP,
the criminal procedure reform process in Indonesia proved
slow. In 2000, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights ("MLHR")
announced the formation of an interagency working group of
government officials, practitioners, and academics ("Working
Group") to draft a new code to replace the 1981 KUHAP. 128 Al-
though the Working Group met intermittently over the next
124. See PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, supra note 62, at 102; see also Wagner &Ja-
cobs, supra note 56, at 54; Surachman & Maringka, supra note 61, at 4 (discretion very
rarely exercised).
125. See Int'l Crisis Group ("ICG"), Indonesia: National Police Reform, at 3, Asia Re-
port No. 13 (Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter ICG] (charting history of Indonesian National
Police).
126. See Surachman & Maringka, supra note 61, at 1.
127. See generally ICG, supra note 125 (identifying major obstacles to police re-
form); AGUNG SUPRANANTO, POLRu: FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM (2005).
128. See Order of Ministry, supra note 107. While the membership of the Working
Group evolved over time, the key members during the critical 2006-07 period were
Professor Andi Hamzah; Abdul Wahid, Director General of Law and Regulation, Minis-
try of Law and Human Rights ("MLHR"); Adnan Buyung Nasution, Presidential Legal
Advisor;Justice Simanjuntak, RetiredJustice of the Supreme Court; Muhammad Amari,
Legal Bureau Chief of the Attorney General's Office; Raden Panggabean, Indonesian
National Police; Sri Hariningsih, legislation expert for the Indonesian Parliament
("DPR"); Hadi Supriyanto and Pocut Eliza, Directorate of Law and Regulation, MLHR;
and Professors Indriyanto Seno Adji and Teuku Nasrullah, University of Indonesia. See
id.
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seven years, its draft version did not differ substantially from the
1981 Code except in one significant respect-the group pro-
posed to create one entirely new legal institution, the hakim
komisaris or "commissioner judge.1 29
Some of the responsibilities proposed by the Working
Group for the new institution of commissioner judge, such as
review of search warrants and detention decisions, are broadly-
recognized core judicial functions widely seen in both civil law
and common law countries. 30 The Working Group also consid-
ered giving the commissioner judges a more executive function
by empowering them to determine whether a case should pro-
ceed to trial and to resolve disputes between the police and the
prosecutors.'' These proposals would have aligned them more
closely to the French/Dutch "investigating magistrate" tradition.
Given the long tradition of civil and political rights abuses by the
police during the Suharto New Order era and beyond, 3 2 greater
supervision of police activities would be an inevitable part of
criminal procedure reform. The extent to which judges might
become part of the law enforcement apparatus, however, re-
mained to be resolved.
Criminal procedure reform, however, had stalled by late
2006. The Working Group had exhausted its drafting funds and
was under pressure to submit its final version. In November
2006, the Resident Legal Advisor ("RLA") of the U.S. Depart-
ment ofJustice's Office for Overseas Prosecutorial Development,
Assistance and Training ("DOJ/OPDAT") 3 3 met with Professor
129. See Hamzah Working Paper, supra note 93, at 1-2 (describing progress on
KUHAP).
130. See Doctrinal Issues, supra note 25, at 1099. For example, in the U.S. federal
system, these functions are generally conducted by a United States magistrate judge. Id.
In a civil law country, a "liberty" or "control" judge increasingly fulfills this role, and
plays a very different function from the investigating judge. Id.
131. See Draft of KUHAP dated Jan. 2007, art. 92 notes; Draft of KUHAP dated
Mar. 2007, art. 15 (unpublished manuscripts, on file with Fordham International Law
Journal).
132. See, e.g., Torture Unpunished in Indonesia, BBC NEWS, Nov. 13, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7109219.stm (U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
reports that police still involved in physical abuse of pretrial detainees).
133. The DOJ/OPDAT previously participated in various criminal procedure re-
forms in countries such as Colombia, Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia. See DOJ/OPDAT
Latin America and the Caribbean Programs, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/opdat/
lat-america/lat am-caribbean-prg.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2008); DOJ/OPDAT Eur-
asia Programs, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/opdat/eurasia/eurasia-programs.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2008). Sometimes, the substantive contributions of foreign ex-
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Hamzah and Abdul Wahid, the Director General of Law and
Regulation at the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, to offer a
combination of logistical support and international legal exper-
tise to aid the Working Group's efforts to finalize the draft
code. 3 " That meeting resulted in a series of seven drafting ses-
sions in Indonesia and one study visit to the United States that
provided the Working Group with the opportunity to rework the
draft KUHAP on a more basic level.' 3 1
Over the next fourteen months, the Working Group revised
the draft code to achieve fundamental reforms in nine areas:
(1) establish a suspect's right to remain silent and the presump-
tion of innocence; (2) protect citizens' liberty and privacy inter-
ests in the area of pretrial detention, search and seizure, and
wiretapping; (3) remove the preliminary investigation stage and
ensure better police/prosecutor cooperation; (4) develop a pre-
trial stage and clarify the role of the commissioner judge to pre-
side over it; (5) simplify indictments; (6) promote adversarial
trial procedures; (7) liberalize the rules of evidence; (8) intro-
duce guilty pleas and cooperating defendants; and (9) assist vic-
tims in receiving compensation from wrongdoers.' 3 6 The Work-
ing Group called upon emerging domestic legal reforms, inter-
national conventions, and comparative criminal procedure
experience in reaching its landmark draft.
3 7
perts are misunderstood. See Spence, supra note 1, at 11-15 (describing DOJ/OPDAT's
role in Russian reform efforts). For example, during Russia's criminal procedure re-
form process in 2000-03, U.S. support was directed at assisting the Russian reformers
draft their own version of a workable, politically acceptable criminal procedure code,
rather than advocating the adoption of U.S. procedures themselves. See id.; see also
Revolution, supra note 1, at 651 (describing the role of USAID in Latin American crimi-
nal procedure reform).
134. See Letter from Robert R. Strang, Resident Legal Advisor, DOJ/OPDAT, to
Abdul Wahid Masru, Director General, Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Nov. 6,
2006) (on file with author); Letter from Robert R. Strang to Abdul Wahid Masru (Dec.
18, 2006) (on file with author). At the outset of this project, neither side expected that
fourteen months later such historic changes would emerge.
135. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 2-5. In addition to the participation of this
Article's author, Professor Stephen Thaman of Saint Louis University participated as an
outside expert in several of the legislative drafting sessions. See id. at 2. DOJ/OPDAT
was not alone in providing technical assistance in 2007-the French Embassy in Jakarta
also brought French Justice Ministry officials to Jakarta to consult with the Working
Group and hosted several Working Group members for a return visit to France. See id.
at 2-5. During the previous six years, members of the Working Group had only limited
opportunities for overseas comparative study. See id.
136. See generally DRAr KUHAP, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
137. See supra Parts I.A, 1.B, & I.C; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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In May 2008, the Working Group submitted its final version
to the MLHR. The Minister of Law approved the draft on
September 8, 2008 and it awaits Presidential and Parliamentary
approval. 13 8
A. Right to Remain Silent
The Working Group addressed a number of substantive
rights that are not clearly protected in the current KUHAP. The
current KUHAP provides that a "suspect has the right to be ex-
amined promptly by the investigator."' 9 This provision does not
envision the right of a defendant to remain silent-the concern
of the provision is that the suspect will not be allowed to provide
his version of the facts. At trial, "[i]f the accused declines to
answer or refuses to answer a question addressed to him, the
head judge at trial shall suggest that he answer and thereafter
the examination shall be continued."' 40 The KUHAP does pro-
hibit the use of coercion to obtain a statement from the sus-
pect."14
The Working Group reversed this presumption. They ad-
ded an explicit statement of the right against self-incrimina-
tion.'4 2 In addition, they established that the investigator was
affirmatively required to provide Miranda-like warnings to the
suspect to inform him or her of this right."' 3 Finally, they estab-
lished that no adverse inference could be drawn against a sus-
pect exercising the right to remain silent.114
B. Pretrial Detention and Privacy Rights
Under the current KUHAP, a defendant can be detained by
the police for up to twenty days without direct judicial review of
his or her detention." 5 However, under international norms
and the ICCPR, which Indonesia ratified in 2006, forty-eight
hours is considered the longest period a criminal detainee must
138. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
139. KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 50(1).
140. Id. art. 175.
141. See id. art. 117(1).
142. DRAr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 90(1).
143. Id. arts. 22(1), 90(3).
144. Id. art. 90(2).
145. See KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 24(1).
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wait before appearing before ajudge. 146 Nevertheless, the Work-
ing Group was concerned that it might be logistically impossible
to bring a defendant before a judge in Indonesia's remote jun-
gles or far-flung islands within this time period.'4 7
The Working Group eventually hammered out a compro-
mise (over continuing objections from the police) 14'-a defen-
dant must be physically brought before a magistrate judge within
five days of arrest to be informed of the charges against him and
given an opportunity to seek pretrial release.' 49 The Working
Group expressly required that the appearance of the detainee
must be in person to deter police brutality and to satisfy the
ICCPR.15 ° As part of the compromise, the Working Group also
added an additional fifteen days to the time a defendant can be
held in pretrial detention, if the magistrate judge approves, to
allow the police sufficient time to carry out their investigation. 15
In addition, the Working Group expanded the reasons to detain
suspects to include detention where there is a concern that the
suspect may seek to influence witnesses. 52
The Working Group also addressed searches and seizures.
Searches must be conducted pursuant to prosecutor's applica-
tion and judicial authorization. 153 Absent compelling reasons,
they must also be executed between six in the morning and ten
at night.1 54 The Working Group clarified the exigent circum-
stances under which the police were entitled to execute a search
and seizure without first obtaining judicial approval, but pro-
vided that the police must seek retroactive judicial approval
within twenty-four hours of such exigent searches.1 55
The Working Group also clarified the area of undercover
146. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, supra note 106, at 20 (recommending Indonesia
reduce "time limits in police custody to 48 hours in accordance with international stan-
dards.").
147. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 24.
148. See Meeting Notes from the Input for KUHAP Finalization from the Indone-
sian Police (Dec. 7, 2007) (unpublished notes, on file with author).
149. DRAFT-r KUHAP, supra note 19, arts. 60(1)-(4). This five-day presentment rule
will not be applicable to terrorism cases because the specific terrorism law permits
longer pretrial detention before review. See id. Elucidations art. 3(2).
150. See id. Elucidations art. 60(1), see also id. pmbl. §d.
151. See id. art. 60(5).
152. See id. art. 59(5)(c).
153. See id. art. 69(1).
154. See id. art. 68(2).
155. See id. arts. 69(3), (5).
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activities. In order to address the reluctance of Indonesian po-
lice either to obtain or to seek to use at trial evidence from cov-
ert work, they expressly authorized the police to conduct surveil-
lance. 156 This addition essentially legalizes the basic undercover
work already being conducted by the police.
Finally, the Working Group drafted a new provision to regu-
late the interception of electronic communications for the new
code 157 in response to the December 2006 decision of the Con-
stitutional Court prohibiting wiretapping in the absence of ex-
press statutory authority. 158 This new provision requires judicial
approval for wiretapping based on a written application from the
prosecutor, requires a showing of investigative necessity, and lim-
its the duration of the interception to thirty days, with one thirty-
day extension permitted.159 Out of concern that the wiretapping
authority would still be abused, the Working Group limited its
use to a list of serious offenses. 160 Under emergency circum-
stances, an investigator can conduct a wiretap without priorjudi-
cial approval, but must retroactively seek such approval within
forty-eight hours.16'
C. Structure of the Investigation
The Working Group addressed two significant problems re-
lating to the investigation: the preliminary investigation stage
and the lack of coordination between the police and prosecutors
during the formal investigation. 162
The preliminary investigation did little either to advance
156. See id. art. 7(1)(i).
157. See id. arts. 83-84.
158. See In re Mulyana Wirakusumah et al., Dec. No. 012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006
(Const. Ct. 2006) (Indon.) (on file with Fordham International Law Journal); see also
supra note 57 and accompanying text.
159. DRAr KUHAP, supra note 19, arts. 83(3)-(6). Indonesia's thirty-day require-
ment falls within international norms. See, e.g., CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE, art. 267(3)
(It.) [hereinafter C.P.P.] (fifteen days with unlimited extensions of up to fifteen days);
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2000) (thirty days with unlimited extensions of up to thirty days);
STAFPROZESSORDNUNG, art. 100b(2) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter STPO] (three months with
one three-month extension).
160. See DRAFT KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 83(2). The Working Group elected to
follow the German model in this respect. See STPO, supra note 159, arts. 100a(1)-(2).
161. See DRAFT KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 84.
162. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 12, 21-22.
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the case or to protect the rights of the accused. 63 With the elim-
ination of the investigating magistrate, the preliminary investiga-
tion had lost its original civil law purpose of a police investiga-
tion to aid the magistrate's later official investigation. 164 Under
the current KUHAP, there is little need for one law enforcement
officer to conduct a preliminary investigation before another law
enforcement officer conducts the formal investigation. There-
fore, the Working Group decided to abolish the preliminary in-
vestigation stage entirely, deleting some six articles of the cur-
rent KUHAP.' 6 5 This bold step will remove a largely redundant
stage in the criminal justice system that serves little purpose
other than to delay getting down to the real business of solving
the crime.
The Working Group also took up the persistent problem of
the lack of coordination between the police and the prosecutors
during the investigation and the prosecution. 1 66 They estab-
lished the broad principle that the "Investigator shall work in
coordination with Public Prosecutor."' 67 The commentary to
the KUHAP further elaborates that this provision "intends that
the public prosecutor should . . . [follow] the progress of the
Investigation process from the beginning and ... [should give]
consultation for significant cases in order to create an integrated
criminal justice system." '68 During the investigation, the police
remain primarily responsible, but "in executing the investiga-
tion, the investigator shall coordinate, consult, and inquire for
direction to the prosecutor to ensure that the case dossier fulfills
material and formal requirements.' ' 69 During the prosecution
phase, the "Investigator[,] upon request from the Prosecutor[,]
shall take certain legal measures to ensure the efficiency of the
execution of the trial or the implementation of the ruling of the
Judge."'7 ° The police must also notify the prosecutor within two
days of initiating or terminating an investigation. 7'
163. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text; see also supra note 54 and accom-
panying text.
164. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
165. The deleted articles are KUHAP arts. 4-5, 102-05.
166. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 12, 21-22.
167. DA, Fr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 8(1).
168. Id. Eludication art. 8(1).
169. Id. art. 13(2).
170. Id. art. 15(3).
171. Id. art. 13(1).
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To realize the goal of closer coordination, the Working
Group also required the participation of prosecutors in seeking
judicial approval before the police could conduct certain signifi-
cant investigative steps.17 2 Once the investigation has begun, the
prosecutor is responsible for submitting applications to obtain
search warrants and wiretaps and for seeking continued deten-
tion from the commissioner judge and later the trial judge. 73
Because the prosecutors now have an essential role in the investi-
gation, the police will have to work with them while the evidence
is gathered to ensure that it is gathered legally. A secondary ben-
efit of this change is that the prosecutor will already be familiar
with the case and have a vested interest in seeing the prosecution
succeed when the police turn the dossier over.
D. Pretrial Stage and Commissioner Judge
One of most significant changes that the Working Group
has proposed for the new code is the development of a pretrial
stage and the establishment of the new institution of the com-
missionerjudge to preside over it. 7 ' The Working Group estab-
lished a specific list of responsibilities for the commissioner
judge. These responsibilities included authorization of search
warrants, electronic surveillance, detention and bail, and ap-
pointment of legal counsel,'7 5 all traditional judicial functions
generally lacking in the current Indonesian system. The Work-
ing Group also gave the commissioner judge an elevated status-
a person could only become a commissioner judge if he had al-
ready been a trial judge for ten years. 176
The key debate within the Working Group was whether the
commissioner judges should also have more "executive" func-
tions similar to the Dutch or French "investigating magis-
trate."'17 7 Should these new officials resolve disputes between the
172. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
173. See id.
174. See DRAfr KUHAP, supra note 19, Elucidations I; Hamzah, supra note 63, at
10-11, 34-40. The concept of creating commissioner judges predated the involvement
of DOJ/OPDAT with the Working Group, but during the course of 2007-08 meetings,
the parameters of the pretrial stage and the role of the Commissioner Judge were devel-
oped. Compare DRAfr KUHAP, supra note 19, arts. 1(7), 111-22, with Draft of KUHAP
dated Nov. 16, 2006, arts. 1(6), 73-78 (on file with Fordham International LawJournal).
175. See DRAvr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 111(1).
176. See id. art. 115(b).
177. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 34-36.
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police and prosecutors and determine whether cases should pro-
ceed to trial or whether additional counts should be added? In
the end, the Working Group decided to follow more closely "the
judge of the investigation" model used in Italy. 178 They did vest
the commissioner judges with the authority to conduct a "pre-
liminary hearing" to determine whether there is sufficient evi-
dence for the case to proceed to trial, but, importantly, they re-
stricted the right to seek this hearing exclusively to the prosecu-
tors. 179 The group decided not to give the judge the authority to
add additional charges following the hearing or to resolve dis-
putes between the police and the prosecutors.
In addition, the Working Group established basic proce-
dures for pretrial practice before the commissioner judges.
Both the prosecutor and defense may seek rulings by the com-
missioner judge (except as noted for sufficiency of the evi-
dence), or the judge may do so on his or her own initiative.18 °
In addition, the commissioner judge can conduct suppression
hearings and has the power to require sworn witness testimony
and documents in order to resolve factual disputes.' 8 ' The com-
missioner judges are given two days to reach their rulings.'82
A final key change was in the area of remedies for the viola-
tion of rights. The Working Group authorized the commis-
sioner judge to suppress illegally-obtained evidence and to order
the release of wrongfully-held suspects." '8 The commissioner
judges were also allowed to award compensation where they find
that the rights of the accused were violated. 84 It was hoped that,
armed with these new powers, the commissioner judges would
protect individual liberties at the pretrial stage.18 5
178. Id.
179. See DRA-r KUHAP, supra note 19, arts. I111 (1) (i), (2)-(3). This provision illus-
trates well the continuing inquisitorial perspective in Indonesia-it assumes that prose-
cutors would want to request a preliminary hearing to see if they possessed sufficient
evidence to proceed.
180. See id. art. 111.
181. See id. arts. 112(2)-(4).
182. See id. art. 112(1).
183. See id. arts. 113(2)-(3).
184. See id. art. 113(5).
185. In this respect, the Working Group followed Italy in creating a judge of the
investigation with evidence supression powers. By way of comparison, the new Russian
Criminal Procedure Code of 2001 adopted Miranda-like requirements and a suppres-
sion remedy, but failed to establish ajudicial officer to handle the pretrial stage, leaving
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E. Indictments
The Working Group tackled the highly formalistic indict-
ment process. Under the current KUHAP, the indictments
themselves are lengthy and full of legalese, going far beyond
what is necessary to give notice to the accused of the nature of
the charges.186 The Working Group refocused the procedure to
require indictments to be clear and concise statements of the
offense charged. 1
87
In addition, the Working Group revised the KUHAP's rules
governing joinder of claims and parties in a single indictment.
Unlike the old rule, under which dossiers had to be submitted to
the prosecutor at or near the same time for claims to be
joined, 88 the draft code provides that the prosecutor may
charge multiple defendants in a single indictment regardless of
the number of dossiers so long as their criminal activity is inter-
related. 89 Similarly, the prosecutor can charge multiple crimes
in separate counts in the same indictment.' 90
In addition to making the indictment system more flexible
and efficient by allowing joinder of claims and defendants, the
new indictment procedures subtly change the prosecutor's role.
Under the old system, the prosecutor took a more bureaucratic
approach-examining a dossier to see if it supported the charge
proposed by the police and then preparing a lengthy charging
instrument to pass onto court. 9 Now, the prosecutor will be
examining the dossier to see what criminal charges are sup-
ported by the facts and making strategic charging decisions
about who to charge in which indictment. 92
F. Adversarial Trials and Liberal Rules of Evidence
One of the explicit goals of the Working Group was to make
the new KUHAP more adversarial. This goal is enshrined in one
of the early provisions of the draft code-" [t] he criminal proce-
the protection of these rights only at trial. See UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'N KODEKS RoS-
SiISKOI FEDERATSI [Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 75 (Russ.) [hereinafter UPK RF].
186. See KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 143.
187. See DRAFT KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 50(2)(b).
188. See KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 141.
189. See DRAvr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 49(3).
190. See id. art. 49(2).
191. See KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 14.
192. See DRAvr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 42.
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dure covered in this Law shall be executed fairly and in an adver-
sarial way. '"'93
This new adversarial emphasis is most evident at the trial
stage. There, the Working Group proposed to make the trial, in
the words of the head of the drafting team, "more adversarial,
but not completely adversarial." Under the new draft language,
the parties will now be given the opportunity to give short open-
ing statements.' 4 Then, the prosecution and the defense will
call witnesses in the order they choose.' 95 It will be the parties,
and not the trial judge, who will initially ask questions of their
respective witnesses followed by examination by the opposing
party, although the judge will remain empowered to ask clarify-
ing questions.196 Finally, the parties will have an opportunity to
make brief closing oral arguments.197
The Working Group consciously recognized that the deci-
sion regarding who would initially ask the questions would be a
factor in determining the adversarial or inquisitorial nature of
the trial proceedings. They sought to obtain the benefits of both
systems-giving the initial power to the parties, but reserving a
role for the court to do some active fact finding of its own.198
The Working Group also fundamentally changed the rules
of evidence. The current KUHAP's limited list of permitted
forms of evidence was expanded to include electronic evidence
and physical evidence. 99 At a more basic level, this expanded
list of acceptable forms of evidence became exemplary, not ex-
haustive, leaving flexibility for prosecutors and defense attorneys
to come up with potential new types of evidence to offer at
193. Id. art. 4. This provision was not adopted from a common law system, but
rather from the former heart of the civil law system-France. See CODE DE PROCEDURE
PENALE, art. l-P, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechCodeArticle.do
[hereinafter C. PR. PEN.]; see also Draft of KUHAP dated Jan. 18, 2006, art. 3A (on file
with author) (noting French origin). The French criminal procedure code has intro-
duced more adversarial elements in recent years, such as guilty pleas, traditionally asso-
ciated with adversarial systems, see C. PR. PEN., supra, art. 41 (2)-(3), and most recently
allowing the prosecutor and defense attorney to question witnesses directly, but it is not
yet clear whether these recent innovations have really shifted the inquisitorial approach
of French judicial actors. See Transplants to Translations, supra note 2, at 59-63.
194. See DRAFr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 150(1).
195. See id. art. 150(3).
196. See id. art. 154.
197. See id. art. 171(1).
198. See id. arts. 154, 176, 178.
199. See id. arts. 175(1), 176, 178.
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trial.2 0 The new standard for admissibility will be: (1) was the
evidence legally obtained; and (2) does it tend to prove guilt or
innocence?20' Evidence will no longer have to fall into a preex-
isting, statutorily-recognized category.
After extensive debate, the Working Group elected to keep
untouched the current KUHAP's requirement of two forms of
2012evidence to support a conviction. They concluded that, as a
practical matter, this rule rarely prevented the prosecution from
obtaining a legitimate conviction and did provide some addi-
tional protection for innocent defendants.
As the world's fourth largest nation by population with few
land borders, Indonesia traditionally was not concerned with
transnational crime and the current KUHAP lacked specific pro-
visions for evidence gathered abroad.2 °3 With transnational
crime becoming a growing concern in Indonesia,2 °4 the Working
Group also took up the question of how to handle foreign evi-
dence. Laws on the collection of evidence vary widely between
different legal systems. The draft KUHAP addresses this fact by
providing that evidence received from abroad "shall be consid-
200. See id.
201. See id. arts. 175(2), 176.
202. See KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 183; DRAFT KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 174.
203. See KUHAP, supra note 39, arts. 183-90.
204. Reflecting this recent interest in obtaining evidence and recovering looted
assets from abroad, Indonesia passed a mutual legal assistance law in 2006. See Law
Regarding Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Law No. 1/2006 (Indon.), available at
http://www.legalitas.org/database/puu/2006/uul-2006eng.pdf. In addition, over the
past decade, Indonesia has entered into or is seeking to enter into bilateral mutual legal
assistance treaties ("MLATs") with Australia, China, Hong Kong, and a regional MLAT
through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"). See Treaty between
Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Austl.-Indon., Jul. 17, 1999, 2076 U.N.T.S. 451; ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ORGANISA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE, Ex-
TRADITION AND RECOVERY OF PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 30, 161-
63 (2007), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/MLA-Extradition-Thematic-Re-
port/MLA-Extradition-Thematic-Report.pdf. Indonesia has also ratified various multi-
lateral United Nations agreements such as the Convention on Transnational Organized
Crime, the Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
and the Convention Against Corruption-each containing "mini-MLATs" that require
international evidence sharing for those specific offenses covered by these conventions.
See UNCAC supra note 100, art. 46, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Dec. 9, 2003), reprinted in 43
I.L.M. 37 (2004); United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
art. 18, G.A. Res. 25, Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25, 2225
U.N.T.S. 275 (Jan. 8, 2001); United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances art. 7, U.N. Doc. E/CONF 82/15 (1988), 1582
U.N.T.S. 164, 181-85 (Nov. 11, 1990), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
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ered valid evidence, if it is legally obtained based on the law of
such other country" so long as "consideration [of] the evidence
does not breach the Indonesian constitutions, laws or coopera-
tion agreement. 20
5
The Working Group also changed the way in which the trial
judge is selected. Under the current KUHAP, the chiefjudge of
the court assigns a particular trial judge to a case.2 ° 6 The current
system permits abuse and potential corruption. 20 7 To remedy
this, the Working Group adopted random assignment of
cases.
208
G. Case Dismissal, Guilty Pleas, and Cooperating Defendants
Although the current KUHAP recognized the possibility of
dismissal of cases not in the public interest,20 9 usually all crimi-
nal cases, even petty prosecutions, were brought to court. The
draft KUHAP specifically authorizes the prosecutor, if in the
public interest, to dismiss minor cases, particularly where there
has been reconciliation between the perpetrator and the vic-
tim. 210
The Working Group also adopted guilty plea provisions for
the resolution of more serious cases.2 1' While the current
KUHAP recognizes the need to consider "mitigating circum-
stances" at sentencing,21 2 a trial is still required.2 13 The Working
Group adopted a procedure to permit a defendant to plead
guilty and avoid a trial altogether. 214 Rather than adopt a U.S.-
style plea bargaining between the parties, the Working Group
chose instead to follow the recently-reformed Russian criminal
procedure code. Like the new Russian code, the Draft KUHAP's
guilty plea provision is not available for the most serious
205. D.Ar KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 183.
206. See KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 152.
207. See SUPREME COURT OF INDONESIA, supra note 112, at n.185 (current assign-
ment system "opens the way for abuse of power" and has "potential for corruption;"
recommending random assignment of cases).
208. See DRAFT KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 142(1).
209. See KUHAP, supra note 39, art. 140(2).
210. See DRAFT KUHAP, supra note 19, arts. 42(2)-(3).
211. See id. art. 199.
212. See KUIHAP, supra note 39, art. 197(1)(f). Mitigating factors include the de-
fendant's acceptance of guilt.
213. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
214. See DRAvr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 199(1).
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crimes-it can only be used oy defendants facing charges pun-
ishable by less than seven years' imprisonment. 215 The plea will
take place before a judge and the defendant enjoys certain pro-
cedural protections during the proceeding. The judge must in-
form the defendant of the rights he is giving up by pleading
guilty and the penalties he faces.2 1 6 The court must also ensure
that the defendant's plea is voluntary and supported by the
facts. 217 If the court is not satisfied, the judge also retains the
power to reject the plea.218  Following the Russian model, de-
fendants who choose to plead guilty receive a sentence of no
more than two-thirds of the maximum statutory sentence.21 9
The Working Group also addressed a variation on the guilty
plea-the cooperating defendant, known as a "crown witness. "220
In doing so, they followed the lead of Indonesia's Witness Pro-
tection Law of 2006 and incorporated language from a draft
amendment to Indonesia's Anti-Corruption Law.2 2 ' This new
provision envisions two situations. First, the draft code provides
for immunity for the most minor participant in a conspiracy who
provides information regarding his more culpable co-conspira-
tors. 2 2 2 Second, where there is no minor participant, the code
provides for sentence reduction for a defendant who pleads
guilty and then assists in disclosing the role of the other partici-
pants. 223 Defendants, however, do not have an automatic right
to become cooperating witnesses; rather, the designation is
215. Compare id. with UPK RF, supra note 185, art. 314 (Russ.); CRIMINAL CODE OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION art. 75 (4th ed. William E. Butler 2004).
216. See DRAFr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 199(3).
217. See id. arts. 199(3)-(4).
218. See id. art. 199(4).
219. Compare id. with UPK RF, supra note 185, art. 316(2) (Russ.).
220. See DRAFr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 200.
221. Andi Hamzah, Draft Bill on Combating Corruption Crimes, art. 52 (Jan. 30,
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). These draft anti-corruption
amendments were also authored by Andi Hamzah, illustrating the cross pollination of
ideas due to the small Indonesian legislative drafting community.
222. See DRAFT KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 200(1) ("One of the suspects or the
accused having the lightest role may become the Witness in the same case and may be
released from any criminal charge if the Witness helps disclose the involvement of any
other suspect that should be sentenced for the offence.").
223. Id. art. 200(2) ("If there is no suspect or accused having a light role in the
offence referred to in paragraph (1), the suspect or the accused who admits to being
guilty based on Article 199 and who substantially helps disclose the offence and the role
of any other suspect may have the sentence reduced at the discretion of the judge of
the district court.").
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under the control of the prosecutor.224
H. Rights of Victims
Finally, the Working Group strengthened the rights of vic-
tims. Under the current KUHAP, a victim must bring a parallel
civil suit within the criminal case in order to receive restitution
from the defendant.225 This system has not proved workable;
Professor Hamzah noted during one of the drafting sessions that
he was not aware of a single time in Indonesia where these provi-
sions had been used effectively.226 The Working Group there-
fore adopted a proposal to replace those articles requiring a par-
allel civil suit with a system of mandatory victim restitution as
part of the final criminal judgment.227
IV. THE KUHAP-MOVING ADVERSARIAL?
The Working Group's Draft KUHAP makes fundamental
changes to Indonesia's criminal justice system. Nevertheless, it
would be simplistic to describe the resulting draft as part of an
inexorable global movement towards an adversarial model of
criminal justice. While some of the planned changes are associ-
ated with the common law tradition, they are not all necessarily
intrinsic to the adversarial system, but rather some are secondary
characteristics that can work equally well within both traditions.
Other proposed changes to the KUHAP fit better within the in-
quisitorial tradition.228 While this may suggest a schizophrenic
approach to reform, these changes are logical outcomes within
the context of the existing Indonesian legal culture and legal
institutions. The Working Group characterized the KUHAP as
"an integration between the European Continental system and
the adversarial system."2 2 9 The reception of this synthesis by the
Indonesian legal community will ultimately determine where the
224. DRAVr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 200(3).
225. See KUHAP, supra note 39, arts. 98-101.
226. Notes by Robert Strang at KUHAP Drafting Session (Dec. 4-8, 2006) (unpub-
lished notes, on file with author).
227. DRAvr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 133(1).
228. Indeed, the drafters still use the language of the inquisotorial system when
characterizing their goals. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 13 ("The aim of the future
criminal procedure code is the pursuit of objective truth . . ").
229. DRAr KUHAP, supra note 19, Elucidations art. 4.
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changes will lead and their consequences for the overall justice
system.
Many of the pretrial rights-based changes, such as the pre-
sumption of innocence 230 and the right against self incrimina-
tion, 23 ' are major changes. The decision to firmly establish these
rights could be seen as part of larger rejection of confidence in
the inquisitorial model of a unified, neutral investigation by the
State. This movement makes the Indonesian system decidedly
more adversarial. In addition to this historical connection, the
method of asserting these rights, which is through a pretrial mo-
tion before the commissioner judge, and the judicial remedy of
suppression for rights violations are adversarial both in origin
and outlook. The assertion of these rights is a paradigmatic
change from the inquisitorial "search for the ultimate truth"
model.2 32
Indonesia's own recent authoritarian past is part of the ex-
planation of the Working Group's adoption of these rights.
Forced confessions, police brutality, and other recent human
rights abuses remain very much a part of the legal consciousness
in Indonesia.23 3 A harder question is whether these newly-articu-
lated rights will change legal actors' conception of their legal
system or whether they will be incorporated into the existing in-
quisitorial framework. For example, many European civil law
systems have incorporated such rights through domestic legisla-
tion or the adoption of the ICCPR, yet have maintained their
inquisitorial tradition.234
230. See id. art. 90(2).
231. See id. arts. 22(1), 90.
232. Many civil law countries have not adopted exclusion rules. See, e.g., Carl F.
Goodman, The Somewhat less Reluctant Litigant: Japan's Changing View Towards Civil Liti-
gation, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 769, 769 n.ll (2006) (Japan); Gordon Van Kessel,
European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REv.
799, 799 (1998) (Netherlands, France, and Germany); see also Sanchez-Llamas v. Ore-
gon, 548 U.S. 331, 395-96 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that civil law na-
tions do not overtly exercise exclusion rules because these criminal justice systems place
more emphasis on judicial investigation). Even in some common lawjurisdictions, such
as the United Kingdom, use weaker Miranda-type rules that permit comment on a de-
fendant's silence. See Mark Berger, Reforming Confession Law British Style: A Decade of
Experience with Adverse Inferences from Silence, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 243, 301-03
(2000).
233, See Mathew Draper, Justice as a Building Block of Democracy in Transitional Socie-
ties: The Case of Indonesia, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 397-99 (2002).
234. See Berger, supra note 5, at 341.
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The decision to create the new institution of the commis-
sionerjudge might make the system seem more inquisitorial and
suggests a return of the powerful investigating magistrate just
when many civil law countries are moving in the opposite direc-
tion. The Working Group, however, followed the adversarial
practice (as well as the increasing practice in civil law countries)
of limiting the commissioner judge's role to core judicial func-
tions such as determining the legality of the investigatory actions
of the police and/or prosecutors such as searches, arrests, and
obtaining custodial statements. 23 5 Overall, however, the commis-
sioner judge is closer in function to the magistrate judge of the
United States or the 'judge of the investigation" model used in
Italy than the "investigating magistrate" of some civil law coun-
tries such as the Netherlands and Spain.23 6
However, one power-the power of the commissioner judge
to stop a case during the pretrial stage-strongly suggests a re-
turn to the investigatory judge model. This gives the commis-
sionerjudge a screening function. 23 7 Balanced against this is the
fact that the commissioner judge's determination whether the
case should proceed may be made only on the motion of the
prosecutor.2"8 As a practical matter, this will substantially reduce
the number of times the commissioner judge becomes involved
in this determination and therefore would seem to limit the pos-
sibility that the commissioner judge will transform into an inves-
tigating judge. But at a more philosophical level, granting the
prosecutor the exclusive right to make this motion reflects a con-
tinued inquisitorial conception of the role of the prosecutor. It
assumes that a prosecutor would wish to have the commissioner
judge decide whether to dismiss a case.2 39 It strongly suggests
235. See DRAFt KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 44.
236. See Hamzah, supra note 59, at 34-35.
237. See id. at 33-34.
238. See DRAF-r KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 44(1).
239. In common law countries that make use of them, grand juries nominally serve
a similar screening function. But there is an important distinction-prosecutors are
required to present the case to grand juries in order to seek an indictment whereas,
under the Draft KUHAP, Indonesian prosecutors would present their case to the com-
missioner judge because they would want an official imprimatur for bringing the case
(or an official excuse for not doing so). When common law prosecutors use grand
juries as an investigative tool, it fulfills an inquisitorial function, a formality which fed-
eral prosecutors would dispense with if they could obtain evidence through other
means. See Robert G. Miller, Comparing the Annual Shareholders Meeting in the United States
with that in Germany-Use of Yankee Concepts of Due Process Discerned by Alexis de Tocqueville,
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that the principle of opportunity is not so ingrained in Indone-
sian legal culture, at least on the part of the Working Group
members. The frequency with which this new provision is used
will indicate whether Indonesian prosecutors see themselves as
parties to a dispute (making the use of the provision unlikely) or
as state officials seeking the "ultimate truth."
The changes to the trial procedures reflect the most signifi-
cant movement toward more adversariness. 240 The parties now
have the power to select the witnesses and their order, ask the
questions, and provide oral argument. This will make the judge
a more passive listener,24' but the court will maintain overall
control of the proceedings and may ask clarifying questions.
Of these changes, the parties' right to take the lead in ques-
tioning the witnesses may prove the most significant, but the
hardest to implement successfully. The criminal procedure
team's conscious goal was to balance the adversarial and inquisi-
torial systems by giving the parties a chance to ask the questions,
but not making the judge into an entirely passive listener.24 2
The fundamental question is: Will the court and the parties
make this system work harmoniously, or will one group domi-
nate?
Based on their historical role in leading the questioning of
witnesses, Indonesian judges may seek to retain their control of
the trial by continuing to question witnesses themselves. By com-
parison, U.S. procedural law does not generally prohibit judges
from asking substantive questions of witnesses, but rather U.S.
legal culture frowns on such judicial activity because it is incon-
sistent with the U.S. conception of the role of the judge as the
neutral referee.243 Indeed, one proposal that was discussed by
19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. IrN'L & CoMP. L. 1, 94 (1999) ("The existence of a grand jury dis-
penses with the need for an investigative staff assigned to a public prosecutor.") (citing
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 79 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Doubleday (1969) (1835)).
240. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 40.
241. See id.
242. See id. ("[T]he active role of the judge to direct the trial is decreased.").
243. See Transplants to Translations, supra note 2, at 9 ("[Clommon lawjudges par-
ticipate in the interrogation of witnesses much less than do their Continental col-
leagues, not only because procedural rules give them less power to do so, but also be-
cause the role of the judge is understood differently in the common law system.
Whereas the inquisitorial judge is understood and perceived as an active investigator
with, consequently, the duty to be active in these interrogations, the adversarial system
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the Working Group was to jettison the investigative dossier en-
tirely as the trial judge's review of the investigative dossier before
trial may limit his capacity to remain impartial. 24" The draft
KUHAP, however, reduces the role of the dossier, but does not
eliminate it.245 Indonesian judges will continue to be in posses-
sion of the facts of the investigation necessary for the judges to
remain the dominant questioners of witnesses.2 46 If the prosecu-
tors wish to take control, they will not only need to develop the
necessary skills, but must also change their outlook.2 4 7
If the prosecutors do take the lead in witness questioning
this may well lead to greater pretrial interaction between the
prosecutors and their witnesses. Such "witness prep" is a hall-
mark of the U.S. trial system, and it builds the sense between
prosecutors and government witnesses that they form a team.
Pretrial consultation between the prosecutor and the witnesses is
not an inherent aspect of all adversarial systems-the English sys-
tem prohibits barristers from meeting with witnesses out of court
precisely to maintain distance between the parties and the wit-
nesses.
248
The proposed reforms to the rules of evidence do not move
the Indonesian code in an adversarial direction; rather, they
make it less formalistic. The common law system has developed
a series of sometimes arcane evidentiary rules to ensure the op-
portunity for adversarial confrontation of opposing witnesses
and to prevent otherwise potentially probative evidence from be-
ing presented to the jury.24 9 By contrast, the civil law tradition of
judicial fact-finding has no need for such limitations; the investi-
judge is usually understood as a passive umpire who is not supposed to participate ac-
tively in the interrogation of witnesses.").
244. See Comparative Approach, supra note 17, at 471.
245. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 22 ("[T]he case dossier is not as important
today, since verification principally occurs in the court session.").
246. See Transplants to Translations, supra note 2, at 15 ("If the written dossier did
not exist because, for instance, it was suppressed through a legal reform, the trial judge
could not behave in such an active way; she could not organize the trial in advance,
interrogate the witnesses effectively, etc., and the parties would gain procedural powers
at her expense.").
247. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 42.
248. See Van Kessel, supra note 11, at 435, 444-45 ("Ethical rules prevent the barris-
ter from interviewing witnesses, thereby guarding against the danger of counsel drilling
or coaching his witnesses.").
249. See generally Mirjan Damaska, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REv.
425 (1992).
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gating magistrate or the trial judge is a judicial officer and does
not need any intermediary to determine what evidence could be
considered.2 ° The proposed KUHAP moves the new eviden-
tiary rules closer to the "free evaluation of evidence" paradigm
of the inquisitorial system. 25' Even this change, however, is tem-
pered by the continued requirement of two types of evidence to
support a conviction 252 and the introduction of suppression of
illegally obtained evidence, a traditionally adversarial concept.
Because of its history and pervasiveness, the introduction of
guilty pleas can be seen as the addition of a quintessential ele-
ment of the adversarial system. The traditional plea bargain is a
consensual resolution of the case between two conflicting parties
with little or no judicial involvement that reflects a very adver-
sarial conception of justice. Plea bargaining, however, was not
always part of the U.S.'system. It arose in the United States as a
necessary response to the crushing burdens that providing a full
blown jury trial, with its entire panoply of rights in every criminal
case, would place on the criminal justice system. 253
By contrast, the inquisitorial system traditionally did not rec-
ognize a "guilty plea" as a reason to stop the determination of
guilt or innocence by the court, rather it was simply a courtroom
confession that the court could weigh in the same manner it
evaluated a post-arrest confession in determining the defen-
dant's guilt.254 However, many civil lawjurisdictions have moved
towards adopting such consensual resolution procedures in part
to respond to their own growing crime rates. 255 Civil law coun-
250. SeeJackson & Kovalev, supra note 44, at 108-09 (explaining that civil law coun-
tries exercise more permissive rules of evidence because they do not use lay adjudica-
tors).
251. See Comparative Approach, supra note 17, at 473.
252. See DRAFT KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 174. Andi Hamzah observed that Indo-
nesia needed to maintain the two types of evidence rule for twenty years as a safeguard
while the judges adjusted to the free evaluation of evidence concept contained in the
KUHAP. See Andi Hamzah, Address at the KUHAP Socialization (Apr. 8, 2008) (unpub-
lished notes, on file with author).
253. See Combs, supra note 17, at 12-16 (describing development of plea bargain-
ing in the United States).
254. SeeJoHN HENRY MERRYMAN & RoGELIO PtREZ-PERDOMO, THE CML LAw TRADI-
TION: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AIMERICA 132 (2007).
255. See Stephen C. Thaman, Plea Bargaining, Negotiating Confessions and Consensual
Resolution of Criminal Cases, in GENERAL REPORTS OF THE XVIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAw, 951, 973-74 (Katharina Boele-Woelki & Sjef
van Erp eds., 2007) [hereinafter Plea Bargaining].
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tries adopted these provisions later than common law countries
only because their existing trial system had proven more effi-
cient in resolving cases quickly.256
Interestingly, however, the Working Group members did
not articulate a need for dismissal of minor cases and guilty pleas
for more serious one in order to relieve the burden on the
courts. Instead, they relied upon a deeper Islamic cultural value
in building group harmony through restorative justice (diat)-
the consensual resolution of a criminal case.2 57 The particular
plea model the Working Group has chosen, the Russian Crimi-
nal Procedure Code, makes sense for Indonesia, a country also
plagued by corruption and suspicion of the Attorney General's
Office.258 Under the Draft KUHAP, there is no negotiated secret
sentencing deal between the prosecutor and defendant facing a
very lengthy jail sentence if convicted at trial. Rather, the Work-
ing Group adopted a simplified and more transparent proceed-
ing where the judge continues to have an active truth-cor-
roborating role and where the judge and the code, not the pros-
ecutor, determine the maximum benefit the defendant shall
251receive.
Similarly, the provisions do not fundamentally change the
role of or balance of power between the differentjudicial actors.
The judge maintains his position atop the hierarchy, while case
processing is expedited. 26" The prosecutor is not empowered to
strike a bargain with the defendant-rather the new KUHAP
seems to envision that the defendant will simply plead "straight
up" to the charges without any agreement. 26' At this stage, there
is no bargain between the parties; the defendant continues to
seek a mitigated sentence from a judge, but with a defined bene-
fit set forth by the code, not given by the prosecutor.262 The
256. See Craig M. Bradley, Book Review, The Convergence of the Continental and the
Common Law Model of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRIM. L.F. 471, 473-75 (1996).
257. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 29, 31.
258. See Wagner & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 196 n.7.
259. Many European countries have chosen to adopt such a statutorily-defined
benefit guilty plea system. See Plea Bargaining, supra note 255, at 976-79 (surveying plea
sentencing discounts provided in civil law countries).
260. DR -r" KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 199.
261. See Hamzah, supra note 63, at 46.
262. By some standards, Indonesia's proposed guilty plea provisions might not
constitute plea bargaining at all. They certainly do not go as far as other civil law coun-
tries, such as Germany and Italy, that permit bargaining for an agreed upon sentence.
See Transplants to Translations, supra note 2, at 39-42.
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adoption of the idea of guilty pleas may develop into "charge
bargaining" in the future.
A bigger philosophical change may result from the provi-
sion for cooperating witnesses in the KUHAP. 26 While the po-
lice have used charge manipulation to encourage cooperation
and the courts have considered a defendant's cooperation as a
mitigating factor at sentencing, the cooperating defendant pro-
vision reflects a significant shift in thinking. As drafted, this co-
operating defendant provision is a tool for law enforcement, not
for case management or offense mitigation, because it provides
explicit sentencing benefits under the control of the prosecu-
tor.26 4 The role of the prosecutor in exclusively determining eli-
gibility for this provision should lead to greater out-of-court in-
teraction between defense counsel, prosecutors, and the pro-
spective cooperating defendant in evaluating whether a
particular defendant is an appropriate candidate. This will not
only pull the prosecutor deeper into the investigation-it makes
him a party to the dispute.
CONCLUSION
The proposed Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana
has demonstrated an important fact: civil law systems have the
flexibility to make fundamental changes to their criminal justice
procedure. While the initial goals of the Working Group were
relatively narrow-to update the existing KUH-AP-their project
evolved into a thorough examination of both the inquisitorial-
based KUH-AP and its underlying criminal justice values. The
Working Group sought to address existing problems within the
Indonesian criminal justice system by incorporating interna-
tional conventions and comparative criminal procedure and
thinking critically how to apply them to the Indonesian context.
The result is striking. Rather than seeking to create a purely
adversarial system, the Working Group has synthesized the two
traditions to produce a far more flexible criminal justice system.
The draft KUHAP removes much of the current KUHAP's legal
formalism that had been uncritically inherited from the Dutch
system and replaces it with a hybrid system that is more adver-
sarial but seeks to preserve part of its inquistorial tradition. The
263. See DRAFr KUHAP, supra note 19, art. 200.
264. See id. art. 200(3).
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question for the future is whether the Indonesian system will ab-
sorb these changes and maintain its inquisitorial structure or
whether the inquisitorial justice system will be transformed by
them.
